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TAX EVASION AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
IN A HIGH-TAX COUNTRY: 





Self-employed individuals have arguably greater opportunities than wage earners to 
underreport their incomes. The incentives for underreporting should be especially strong in an 
economy with generally high taxes. This paper uses recent income and expenditure data to 
examine the extent of underreporting of income among self-employed individuals in Sweden. 
A key hypothesis is that underreporting of incomes among the self-employed would be visible 
in the data as “excess food consumption”, for a given level of observed income. Our results 
confirm the underreporting hypothesis. In particular, we estimate that households with at least 
one self-employed member underreport their total incomes by around 30 percent. 
Underreporting appears to be twice as prevalent among self-employed people with 
unincorporated businesses as among those with incorporated businesses. 
JEL Code: D12, H24, H25, H26. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that self-employed people can more easily underreport their taxable 
incomes than wage earners are able to do. Several researchers have tried to estimate the extent 
of underreporting by using information on consumption expenditure and reported income. 
The key idea is that expenditure on food is accurately reported by all people participating in 
an expenditure survey, or at least that there is no systematic misreporting that is related to 
employment status. If the self-employed underreport their incomes, this would be visible in 
the data as “excess food consumption” among self-employed people, for a given level of 
observed income. If one can get an estimate of the extent of underreporting, it is also possible 
to get an estimate of the size of the black economy relative to GDP that is related to self-
employment activities. 
 
The expenditure-based approach to estimation of tax evasion and the size of the black 
economy was pioneered by Pissarides and Weber (1989) and has been applied in a number of 
other studies. Pissarides and Weber examined British data from 1982; Apel (1994) provided 
evidence for Sweden using data from 1988; Johansson (2000) used Finnish data from the mid-
1990s; Schuetze (2002) examined consumption and income in Canada over the period 1969-
1992; Lyssiotou et al (2004) investigated consumption and income using British data from 
1993. The studies by Apel, Johansson and Schuetze follow the Pissarides and Weber approach 
closely, whereas Lyssiotou et al develop a somewhat different methodology based on 
consumer demand systems. An alternative nonparametric methodology is developed by Tedd 
(2004).  
 
The available empirical studies generally support the basic hypothesis: self-employed people 
do tend to underreport their incomes relative to wage earners. There is, however, considerable 
dispersion in the estimates of underreporting. Pissarides and Weber (1989) estimate the mean 
underreporting to around 55 percent, whereas Apel (1994) report a mid-point estimate of 
around 35 percent. Schuetze (2002) reports underreporting in the interval 11 to 23 percent, 
whereas Johansson (2000) estimates underreporting by some 27 percent on average. 
Lyssiotou et al (2004) estimate that true income for blue collar self-employed people is more 
than 100 percent greater than reported income, whereas true income for white-collar self-
employed people exceeds reported income by 64 percent. The implications of these various 
estimates on the relative size of the black economy depend to the relative importance of self-
employment in the economy. Pissarides and Weber conclude that black economy activities   2
related to self-employment amount to 5 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom; Apel gets an 
estimate for Sweden of only 1 percent, whereas Johansson gets 2 percent for Finland. The 
estimates in Lyssiotou et al imply that close to 11 percent of the UK economy involves black 
economy activities related to self-employment. The dispersion in estimates is thus 
considerable, and the reasons for the different estimates are not well understood. 
 
This paper takes a new look at consumption expenditure and reported income among self-
employed people and wage earners in Sweden. Sweden has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio in 
the world, and there is a presumption that the incentives for tax evasion would be particularly 
pertinent in such an economy.
1 We use two samples, the first for the years 1999-2001 and the 
second for 2003-2004. Our results confirm the underreporting hypothesis. Specifically, we 
estimate that the degree of income underreporting hovers around 30 percent of household 
income for a household with at least one self-employed member.  
 
We also examine whether the degree of underreporting varies by the legal form of self-
employment and find striking differences between incorporated and unincorporated 
businesses: self-employed in the latter category are much more prone to underreporting than 
those in the incorporated category. We interpret these differences as the outcome of 
differences in regulations that entail higher costs of tax evasion associated with incorporated 
business activities. These results based on expenditure patterns are consistent with observed 
earnings differences between paid employees and self-employed individuals. Controlling for 
human capital characteristics and industry affiliation, we find that self-employed individuals 
with unincorporated businesses report substantially lower incomes than employees as well as 
lower incomes than self-employed in the incorporated category. 
 
The next section discusses briefly the Pissarides and Weber methodology. Section 3 of the 
paper presents the data, section 4 gives the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Estimating Tax Evasion from Expenditure Data 
The Pissarides and Weber approach can be illustrated by means Figure 1. Let c denote log 
food consumption,  ln
F cC = , and y log disposable income,  ln
D y Y = . The figure shows two 
                                                 
1 According to OECD data, the tax-to-GDP ratio in Sweden stood at 50.7 percent in 2004 which is the highest 
ratio among OECD countries; Denmark came second at 49.6 percent. Agell et al (1996) provide an overview and 
evaluation of the major 1991 reform of the Swedish tax system. Sandmo (2005) presents a recent survey of the 
theory of tax evasion.   3
log-linear consumption-income profiles (Engel curves), one for self-employed people (SE) 
and one for wage earners (WE). By assumption, the elasticity of consumption with respect to 
income is equal for the two groups; the Engel curves have thus the same slopes. However, we 
allow the intercepts to differ so as to capture the possibility of underreporting of income 
among self-employed people. Imagine two individuals, one self-employed and one wage 
earner, who both report consumption level  * c . The wage earner reports income level 
w y  
whereas the self-employed person reports income 
s y . Suppose that consumption is truthfully 
reported by both types and that income corresponds to true income for the wage earner but not 
for the self-employed person. If preferences are the same, we can infer that the self-employed 
person’s true income is 
w y  rather than reported 
s y . The extent of underreporting is thus 
given by 
ws yy − .  
 




Now suppose that we pool the data for self-employed people and wage earners and estimate 
an equation of the form: 
 
(1)  ii i i i cX y S E α βγ ε =+ + +  
 
where subscript i denotes individual i, X is a vector of variables affecting consumption (in 





w y  
s y  
* c    4
error term. The parameter γ  captures the vertical distance between the two Engel curves; 
0 γ > implies some underreporting of income among self-employed people. The degree of 
underreporting (in logs) is obtained as  /
ws yyγ β −= . For example, if  .05 γ =  and  0.5 β = , 
we get  /0 . 1 0 γ β = , which says that self-employed people underreport their incomes by 
around 10 percent. The percentage difference is generally obtained as 
[ ] 100 exp( / ) 1 D γβ ≡× − . We might alternatively express underreporting in terms of 
exp( / ) k γ β ≡ , which gives the number by which a self-employed person’s disposable 
income has to be multiplied so as to get the true disposable income. With  .05 γ =  and 
0.5 β = , we get k=1.105.  
 
The estimate of underreporting obtained from eq. (1) pertains to disposable income. We might 
alternatively express underreporting in terms of gross income. Let 
* Y  denote true gross 
income, U the amount of underreported income and define 
** /( ) YYU κ ≡−  as the ratio 
between true and reported gross income. It follows that  (1 ) kt t κ = −+ , where t is the effective 
tax rate.
2 Clearly, we have k κ < .  
 
Estimation of (1) raises several issues that are discussed in Pissarides and Weber (1989) and 
some of the subsequent literature. One issue is how income should be interpreted and treated 
in the estimation. The most relevant income concept is arguably permanent income rather 
than current income. However, existing data sets include only data on current incomes. 
Pissarides and Weber, as well as much of the subsequent literature, have attempted to resolve 
this problem by treating current income as endogenous and pursued instrumental variable 
estimation. A potential problem with this approach is that it relies on perhaps arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions for identification: one needs to find variables that affect disposable 
income without directly affecting also food consumption. We will present results from OLS 
as well as from IV estimations; in fact, the results are very similar.  
 
 
                                                 
2 By effective tax rate we mean t=1 - (disposable income/total factor income). Transfers to households add to 
disposable income and thus reduces the effective (average) tax rate. Reported disposable income,
D Y , is given as 
** ()
D YY t Y U =− −. We have  ** /( ) YYU κ ≡−  and k is the ratio between true disposable income and reported 
disposable income. We thus get (1 ) kt t κ =− + .   5
3. The Data 
We have used data from the Swedish Household Budget Survey (Hushållens utgifter, HUT) 
from 1999-2001, 2003 and 2004.
3 Data for 1999-2001 are based on surveys to households that 
include the second quarter of 1999 up to the first quarter of 2002. Around 9000 randomly 
selected households were approached over these years, but only slightly above 50 percent of 
those did actually participate in the surveys. In 2003 and 2004, 4000 households were 
approached each year and the response rate was 58 percent both years. The response rates are 
thus fairly low, although not exceptionally low for these kinds of time intensive surveys.  
 
The 1999-2001 surveys are produced and presented by Statistics Sweden as one survey and 
we will refer to it as HUT 1999-2001. The other two surveys are produced and presented by 
Statistics Sweden as two separate surveys. We will concatenate the surveys for 2003 and 2004 
and refer to the resulting linked data set as HUT 2003-2004. The HUT data contain no panel 
elements.  
 
The participating households were asked to report their consumption expenditures during 
randomly selected two-week periods. In addition, supplementary questions were asked 
regarding expenditures over the past 12 months. Various other questions were asked so as to 
get information on household characteristics, including employment status and occupation. 
Information about disposable incomes is obtained from official income and tax registers and 
merged with the expenditure data.  
 
The two key variables are annual food consumption and annual disposable income. We follow 
the literature by focusing on food consumption on the assumption that this is truthfully 
reported and that expenditure functions for food are similar for employees and self-employed 
people. Our measure of food consumption is reported in the data as “food purchases”.
4 
Disposable income is based on all types of (register-based) incomes, including transfers. 
Taxes are deducted from gross income so as to get household disposable income. 
 
We focus on consumption and incomes among employees and self-employed people. Self-
employment status can be defined in several ways. Most previous studies in this genre have 
                                                 
3 The design and main results of the HUT-studies are presented in reports from Statistics Sweden (2003, 2004, 
2005).  
4 We have obtained similar results for broader measures of food consumption, such as food purchases plus meals 
out.    6
classified households by using information on income shares attributed to paid employment 
and self-employment.
5 A problem with this approach, besides the difficulty of choosing the 
borderline, is that it may be sensitive to the legal form of the business. A person who runs an 
incorporated business may be formally employed by the company and receive the main part 
of the compensation in the form of wage income.  
 
We prefer to make use of self-reported information on employment status of the individual 
household members. As a requirement for sample inclusion we require either that (i) at least 
one member of the household is employed or self-employed, or that (ii) two members are 
employed or self-employed. The self-employed category includes incorporated as well as 
unincorporated businesses and the data contain information about the legal form. We have 
excluded farmers, however, assuming that their food purchases exhibits a pattern relative to 
income that differs from other self-employed people. Following Pissarides and Weber (1989) 
and others in the literature, we also restrict the analysis to households with married or 
cohabiting couples. The bigger sample, fulfilling criterion (i), comprises around 3000 
households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The smaller sample (ii) includes a little 
more than 2000 households for 1999-2001 as well as for 2003-2004. The share of self-
employed varies between 13 and 16 percent according to the adopted definitions.
6 A first look 
at the data is given in Table 1. 
 
The table displays average food consumption and disposable incomes among employees and 
self-employed in our sample. A household is here classified as self-employed if at least one 
member is self-employed. Average incomes are slightly higher among employees, whereas 
food consumption is higher among the self-employed. It is thus clear that food consumption 
relative to income is higher, on average, among self-employed people. The difference 
amounts to around 4 percentage points.
7 This pattern is what we would expect according to 
the hypothesis that self-employed people are more likely to underreport their true incomes. Of 
                                                 
5 Pissarides and Weber (1989) define households as self-employed if income from self-employment accounts for 
at least 25 percent of total income. 
6 The fraction of self-employed in total employment is 10 percent according to the labor force surveys of 2000. 
Note that our sample is restricted to couples. Moreover, our measure of the rate of self-employment in 
households is not directly compared to the labor force survey data based on individuals. 
7 The food consumption ratios are substantially lower in 2003-2004 than in the previous surveys, a pattern also 
visible in the aggregate data published by Statistics Sweden. The likely main reason for the differences is that the 
measurement techniques have changed. According to Statistics Sweden (2003), the surveys for 1999-2001 
produced an upward bias in food consumption by inducing households to include some non-food items in their 
reports of food purchases.   7
course, this is just a first look at the data and we need to control for other variables that may 
affect consumption. This is the topic for the next section. 
 
Table 1. Means of variables.  
  1999 -- 2001  2003 -- 2004 
 
Households with at 
least one member 
employed or self-
employed 
Households with at 
least two members 
employed or self-
employed 
Households with at 
least one member 
employed or self-
employed 
Households with at 
least two members 
employed or self-
employed 





















D Y    12.736  12.6560  12.788 12.721 12.860 12.774 12.924 12.812 
ln
F C   10.783 10.852 10.818 10.865 10.646 10.682 10.689 10.708 
/
F D CY   0.161 0.204 0.155 0.194 0.122 0.158 0.119 0.155 
# obs.  2684 379 2052 314 2516 425 1874 363 
Notes: Disposable income ( D Y ) and food consumption ( F C ) is in units of SEK, 2001 prices for 1999-2001 and 
current prices for 2003-2004. A household is classified as self-employed if at least one member is self-employed. 
A few households with income above two million SEK are excluded.  
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
We have estimated a number of models along the lines of eq. (1). That is, we regress log food 
consumption on log disposable income and a bunch of control variables. The latter include 
age and age squared, type of housing, number of children under age 20, average years of 
education among adult household members, and region of residence.
8 We use two alternative 
definitions of self-employment status. One variable (SE_1), with associated parameter 1 γ , is a 
dummy for households where at least one member is self-employed. The second variable 
                                                 
8 Age is the age of the “household head”, which is the person with the highest income in the household; type of 
housing is a dummy for single family housing; regions are so called H-regions, which capture the degree of 
urbanization.    8
(SETOT), with associated parameter  2 γ , is the number of persons who are self-employed in 
the household; this variable takes only three values in our sample, viz. 0, 1 or 2.  
 
Preliminary analyses revealed very similar results for the 1999-2001 sample and the 2003-
2004 sample. We have therefore decided to concatenate all data, thus obtaining a data set 
comprising five years. The estimation results for the basic specification are set out in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Estimation results for the pooled data. Dependent variable: ln
F C  
  Households with at least one 
member employed or self-employed 
Households with at least two 











































SE_1  1 () γ   .065 
(3.55)    .070 
(3.53)    .056 
(2.92)    .054 
(2.60)   
SETOT 
2 () γ      .064 
(3.98)    .069 
(4.35)    .055 
(3.32)    .054 
(3.14) 
exp( / ) j k γ β ≡   1.32 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.29 1.28  1.34  1.34 
2 R   .204 .204 .203 .204 .192 .193  .191  .191 
# obs.  6004 6004 5965 5965 4603 4603  4574  4574 
Notes: SE_1: at least one self-employed; SETOT: number of self-employed {0,1,2}. The other controls are age, age 
squared, number of children, single family house, average years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region 
and a dummy for 2003-2004. The instruments used in the IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. 
Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. Robust standard errors, absolute t-values in parentheses. 
 
   9
In the IV estimations we use two variables to achieve identification, viz. income from capital 
and property taxes. Property taxes are closely related to the market value of owned housing 
(including housing used for recreational purposes). A comparison across columns shows that 
the coefficients pertaining to self-employment status are fairly robust as well as statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The interpretation is that self-employed households are 
characterized by “excess food consumption” by 5 to 7 percent. That is, they spend 5 to 7 
percent more on food relative to wage earners with the same reported income.  
 
The extent of underreporting, as measured by  exp( / ) j k γ β ≡ , varies in a fairly narrow band 
around 1.30. That is, the degree of underreporting amounts to 30 percent. Our estimates of 
underreporting are in the same (big) ballpark as those reported in most previous studies (with 
the exception of Lyssiotou et al, 2004). 
 
These estimates of underreporting are expressed in terms of disposable income. Using the fact 
that the ratio between true and reported gross income is given by  (1 ) kt t κ = −+ , we obtain 
1.23 κ ≈  in our data. Effective tax rates are fairly low in our sample, reflecting the fact that 
taxes to a substantial degree are used to finance transfers to households.  
 
Self-employment status according to our definitions does not exactly correspond to the share 
of household income that can be attributed to self-employment. Recall that k=1.30 means that 
households with self-employed members underreport their disposable incomes by 30 percent. 
However, self-employed households typically include also employees with wage incomes so 
30 percent is not an estimate of how much underreporting of self-employment income there is. 
To arrive at such an estimate, we define self-employment income as including (i) 
entrepreneurial income
9 and (ii) wage income for households with incorporated businesses 
(on the assumption that owners of incorporated businesses are employed by their companies). 
Let μ  denote the ratio between this (adjusted) measure of reported gross income from self-
employment and total reported gross income among self-employed households. Under-
















                                                 
9 In Swedish, this concept is known as “inkomst av näringsverksamhet”.    10
 
where 
s Y  is reported income from self-employment in self-employment households 
(assuming that underreporting is only relevant for self-employment income). 
 
In our data for 2003-2004, we have  0.43 μ ≈  so we obtain  0.35
s D ≈ using κ =1.23.
 11 Thus, 
we can conclude that households with at least one self-employed member underreport their 
incomes from self-employment by roughly 35 percent. Note that this is a conservative 
estimate since μ  is an upper bound of self-employment income relative to total income. 
 
Heterogeneous Effects 
Among the self-employed in our sample, around 50 percent runs an incorporated business. 
Those with incorporated businesses are presumably employed by their company and paid by 
the company. Indeed, our data reveal that wage incomes account for a much higher share of 
gross income among self-employed households with incorporated businesses than among 
those with unincorporated businesses.  
 
Incorporated businesses are circumscribed by other and more elaborate legal rules than those 
relevant for unincorporated business activities. The transactions pertaining to the corporation 
and those pertaining to the owner should be kept apart. An annual financial report, which 
becomes public information, should be delivered for each financial year. Moreover, a certified 
auditor must be appointed and the auditor’s report on the financial transactions of the 
company is public information. For unincorporated businesses, on the other hand, the 
borderline between the owner’s and the company’s financial transactions is fuzzy and the 
transactions are less easily scrutinized by outsiders. These differences in the legal form of 
self-employment are likely to influence incentives for tax evasion. There is a presumption that 
the more stringent legislation pertaining to incorporated businesses means higher costs of tax 
evasion. 
 
We have examined whether the legal form of self-employment matters by including variables 
for incorporated and unincorporated businesses, respectively. The definitions are analogous to 
those already defined. For example, SE_1 (inc.) takes the value of one when at least one 
household member runs an incorporated business. The results are given in Table 3.  
                                                 
11 It is more difficult to disentangle income sources in the 1999-2001 data so we focus on 2003-2004.    11
Table 3. Underreporting by the legal form of self-employment. Dependent variable: ln
F C . 
  Households with at least one 
member employed or self-employed 
Households with at least two 















































(1.58)    .040 
(1.62)    .028 
(1.09)    .030 




(3.47)    .098 
(3.37)    .084 
(3.12)    .079 
(2.55)   
SETOT 
(inc.)    .041 
(1.92)    .042 
(1.96)    .031 
(1.40)    .032 
(1.45) 
SETOT 
(uninc.)    .086 
(3.76)    .095 
(3.65)    .080 
(3.40)    .078 
(2.82) 
exp( / ) j k γ β ≡  
(inc.) 
1.18 1.19 1.16 1.17 1.13  1.15  1.17  1.18 
exp( / ) j k γ β ≡  
(uninc.) 
1.46 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.45  1.43  1.50  1.49 
2 R   .204 .204 .204 .204 .192  .193  .192  .192 
# obs.  6004 6004 5965 5965 4603  4603  4603  4603 
Notes: SE_1: at least one self-employed (incorporated, unincorporated); SETOT: number of self-employeed 
(incorporated, unincorporated). The controls are age, age squared, number of children, single family house, average 
years of schooling in the household, six dummies for H-region and a dummy for 2003-2004. The instruments used in the 
IV estimations are income from capital and property taxes. Households with incomes above 2 million SEK are excluded. 
Robust standard errors, absolute t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
There is a clear pattern in the results suggesting that self-employment associated with 
incorporated businesses involves less tax evasion than self-employment in general. Self-
employed with incorporated businesses underreport some 15 to 20 percent of their incomes, 
although these estimates are typically only marginally significant. Self-employed with   12
unincorporated businesses underreport at the rate of 40 to 50 percent. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that incorporated businesses face higher costs of tax evasion as 
a result of more detailed regulations. 
 
We can also in this case ask how large proportion of self-employment income that is hidden 
from the authorities. Among households with unincorporated businesses, entrepreneurial 
income accounts on average for roughly 40 percent of total household income. To get an 
estimate of the amount of hidden entrepreneurial income, we use (2) and arrive at  0.50
s D ≈ . 
That is, self-employed households with unincorporated businesses hide around 50 percent of 
their true incomes. 
 
We have also checked for heterogeneous age effects by including interactions between the 
self-employment variables and a dummy for household heads over the median age (which is 
44 in the data). However, we did not find any evidence that the propensity to underreport 
varies by age. Analogously, we have checked whether the effect varies by gender by 
interacting self-employment status and a gender dummy (equal to one if the self-employed 
person is a woman). We found no statistical significance for this interaction variable. We also 
checked whether skilled blue collar workers are more prone to tax evasion relative to other 
employees, a hypothesis motivated by anecdotal evidence as well as some previous empirical 
findings (see Pissarides and Weber, 1989, and Persson, 2006). However, we could not find 
any systematic evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
 
Corroborating Evidence: Income and Employment Status 
An arguably straightforward approach to examine tax evasion by employment status would be 
to look at differences in reported income between employees and self-employed individuals 
with similar measurable human capital and other characteristics. That is, we could estimate 
models of the form 
 
(3) ln ii i i YZ S E δ ση =+ +  
 
where Y  is gross income, i.e., income before taxes and transfers. Z is a vector of personal 
characteristics and SE a dummy for (individual) self-employment status. A negative sign of   13
σ  would be consistent with underreporting of income among the self-employed.
12 Of course, 
a negative estimate could also reflect compensating income differences, which could be 
present to the extent that individuals place a positive value of self-employment status because 
it may confer non-pecuniary benefits such as personal independence (“being your own boss” 
etcetera).
13 On the other hand, the self-employed are known to work longer hours than the 
typical employees, a fact that would contribute to higher annual earnings.
14 
 
We have estimated a number of equations of the type given by (3) on data for 2004, focusing 
as before on married (or cohabiting) individuals aged 20 to 64. The specifications include, 
inter alia, some 50 industry dummies as well as six regional dummies. The results are 
displayed in Table 4. The estimates in the first three columns are based on a narrow income 
concept, whereas the last three columns are based on a broad concept that includes all 
incomes from labor and capital.  
 
The estimates imply that self-employed individuals earn substantially lower incomes than 
wage earners. For given characteristics, the level of (reported) income is around 40-50 percent 
lower among the self-employed individuals with unincorporated businesses.
18 For individuals 
with incorporated businesses, the negative “effect” is smaller (in absolute value) and at best 
only marginally significant  
 
The patterns set out in Table 4 are consistent with what we found in the analysis of 
consumption behavior, i.e., strong evidence of underreporting for households with 
unincorporated businesses but only weak evidence for households with incorporated 
businesses. The results in Table 4 might, however, reflect compensating income differences 
associated with employment status as well as underreporting of incomes. Although this seems 
likely, it is not clear why the legal form of a business ownership should matter much for job 
satisfaction.  
                                                 
12 Persson (2005) compares earnings among employees and self-employed using Swedish data for 2002 and find 
substantially lower reported earnings among the self-employed even after having standardized for industry 
affiliation. The paper does not distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated businesses, however. 
13 See Hamilton (2000) for a study of the returns to self-employment in the United States. Hamilton finds a 
substantial “earnings penalty” associated with self-employment, a result that he interprets as evidence of 
nonpecuniary self-employment benefits. Blanchflower (2004) surveys the literature on self-employment and 
reports that job satisfaction is higher among self-employed than among wage earners. 
14 According to the Swedish labor force surveys for 2004, paid employees worked on average 35 hours per week 
whereas self-employed people worked 43 hours. 
18 The estimates in column (1) imply exp( .701) 1 0.5 −− ≈ − , whereas the estimates in column (4) imply 
exp( .500) 1 0.4 −− ≈ − .    14
Table 4. Income and self-employment status 2004. Dependent variable: lnY . 


























































Female  -.449 
(13.13)     -.440 
(3.10)    




































2 R   .256 .243 .178  .265  .227  .190 
# obs.  2548 1306 1242  2551  1307  1444 
Notes: All specifications include region dummies as well as a full set of (feasible) industry dummies (maximum 
52). Total factor income include – in addition to wages and entrepreneurial income – dividends, interest 
payments and capital gains. Robust standard errors, absolute t-values in the parentheses. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our study of food expenditure and incomes among employees and self-employed has 
produced results that are broadly consistent with findings from previous studies. There is 
strong evidence of “excess food consumption” among the self-employed, for a given level of 
disposable income. A plausible interpretation is that the pattern reflects underreporting of   15
incomes among the self-employed. The magnitude of underreporting is non-trivial: our 
estimates suggest that the households with at least one member underreport their total 
incomes at the average rate of 30 percent and their incomes from self-employment by around 
35 percent. Our results also imply that tax evasion is most pronounced among self-employed 
who run unincorporated businesses. We interpret this finding as indicating higher costs of tax 
evasion for owners of incorporated businesses since their transactions are more easily exposed 
to public scrutiny. 
 
Our look at income differentials between employees and self-employed offers results 
consistent with the analysis of consumption data. Reported incomes among the self-employed, 
and in particular those with unincorporated businesses, are substantially lower than incomes 
among employees even after controlling for human capital characteristics and industry 
affiliation at a fairly detailed level. Although this pattern could reflect many different forces, 
including compensating earnings differences, it seems likely that tax evasion behavior is part 
of the story. In fact, longer work hours would tend to create an earnings advantage (rather 
than a penalty) for the self-employed.  
 
There is no obvious policy prescription that follows from our results. However, the fact that 
tax evasion seems to depend on the legal form of self-employment is of potential policy 
relevance. The regulatory framework pertaining to small firms is subject to ongoing policy 
discussions, often emphasizing the need to simplify the regulations so as to facilitate 
entrepreneurship. One issue concerns whether independent auditing should be required for all 
incorporated businesses, including (very) small firms. The details of the regulatory framework 
matter for incentives for tax evasion, a consideration that needs to be acknowledged in the 
policy discussions.  
   16
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